Howard Marks

Oaktree Capital Management

Oaktree Capital Management, Howard Marks on cycles, risk and credit markets

Oaktree is primarily a credit and distressed-investing institution, and Howard Marks' memos are the core public asset. Public equity holdings are useful, but the real value is the cycle framework: risk appetite, credit spreads, defaults, and investor psychology.

Sources Oaktree Capital Management official site SEC EDGAR profile Oaktree Howard Marks bio

Credit cycles / distressed value CIK 949509

2026-03-31 Latest 13F 20 Current holdings 72 Last 2 periods Change 13 Public materials

Latest 13F snapshot 2026-03-31 · 140 disclosed positions · $6.3B Top five 32.0%: TRMD, EXE, AU, GTX, TDS

Public materials

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Shareholder letters / memos 13

Interview 0

Public video 0

Public Q&A / speeches / presentations 0

Current holdings

13F period 2026-03-31 · Filed 2026-05-15

Stocks	Shares	Value	Weight
TRMD	23,839,575	$675.1M	10.7%
EXE	5,237,477	$575.0M	9.1%
AU	3,223,092	$313.8M	5.0%
GTX	14,594,816	$265.2M	4.2%
TDS	4,292,243	$180.7M	2.9%
VNOM	3,791,432	$178.2M	2.8%
CORZ	9,400,708	$139.9M	2.2%
STKL	20,726,126	$134.2M	2.1%
PBR	6,089,413	$126.4M	2.0%
B	2,624,859	$107.1M	1.7%
TLN	331,117	$105.7M	1.7%
LBTYA	8,551,191	$103.4M	1.6%
ITUB	12,188,995	$102.1M	1.6%
NOK	11,200,308	$90.1M	1.4%
TAC	6,415,253	$84.1M	1.3%
CBL	2,153,717	$82.8M	1.3%
FCX	1,220,122	$71.7M	1.1%
XP	3,172,009	$60.4M	1.0%
AERO	3,968,686	$55.6M	0.9%
BLCO	3,382,739	$53.8M	0.9%

Last 2 quarters US 13F new / increased / reduced / sold-out positions

As of 13F 2026-03-31 · Filed 2026-05-15

Last 1 quarters Last 2 quarters Last 3 quarters Last 4 quarters

Stocks	Action	13F period	Current shares	Previous shares	Share change	13F value change
INDV	Major increase	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	212,875,428	7,108,644	2894.6%	-$248.1M
TRMD	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	23,839,575	26,425,059	-9.8%	+$147.8M
PBR	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	6,089,413	0	-	+$126.4M
FTAI	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	517,328	-100.0%	-$101.8M
NU	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	4,479,175	-100.0%	-$75.0M
VNOM	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	3,791,432	6,285,062	-39.7%	-$64.6M
GRAB	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	11,207,699	-100.0%	-$55.9M
CRDO	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	539,000	0	-	+$50.6M
YPF	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	886,465	0	-	+$41.0M
VIST	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	782,250	-100.0%	-$38.1M
YMM	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	3,519,764	-100.0%	-$37.8M
SBLK	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	1,962,892	-100.0%	-$37.7M
CX	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	2,763,083	5,749,324	-51.9%	-$34.5M
GTX	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	14,594,816	17,094,816	-14.6%	-$32.8M
NOK	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	11,200,308	18,752,229	-40.3%	-$31.3M
CRC	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	694,502	-100.0%	-$31.1M
BZ	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	1,523,231	-100.0%	-$31.0M
TDS	Major increase	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	4,292,243	3,688,386	16.4%	+$29.5M
AERO	Minor increase	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	3,968,686	3,776,986	5.1%	-$27.3M
EMBJ	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	447,606	0	-	+$26.6M
VALE	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	2,023,706	-100.0%	-$26.4M
B	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	2,624,859	2,975,118	-11.8%	-$22.5M
INFY	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	1,094,752	-100.0%	-$19.5M
CORZ	Minor increase	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	9,400,708	8,350,708	12.6%	+$18.3M
ONIT	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	390,835	-100.0%	-$17.9M
EXE	Minor increase	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	5,237,477	5,062,363	3.5%	+$16.3M
SMPL	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	1,128,889	0	-	+$16.2M
AU	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	3,223,092	3,847,991	-16.2%	-$14.4M
ECVT	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	2,393,791	4,254,503	-43.7%	-$10.6M
CBL	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	2,153,717	2,517,576	-14.5%	-$10.4M
BHC	Sold out	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	0	1,270,000	-100.0%	-$8.8M
TEO	Major reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	1,622,244	2,347,508	-30.9%	-$8.3M
NRG	New	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	49,028	0	-	+$7.2M
XP	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	3,172,009	3,320,159	-4.5%	+$6.0M
ITUB	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	12,188,995	13,822,747	-11.8%	+$3.2M
OPTU	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	7,330,490	7,500,000	-2.3%	-$2.8M
TX	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	582,924	658,565	-11.5%	-$1.7M
FCX	Minor reduction	2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15	1,220,122	1,390,053	-12.2%	+$1.1M
TRMD	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	26,425,059	40,581,120	-34.9%	-$307.3M
INDV	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	7,108,644	257,785,398	-97.2%	+$244.4M
GTX	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	17,094,816	31,894,816	-46.4%	-$136.4M
AERO	New	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	3,776,986	0	-	+$82.9M
SATS	Sold out	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	0	600,000	-100.0%	-$45.8M
AU	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	3,847,991	4,185,261	-8.1%	+$33.8M
NBR	Sold out	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	0	737,112	-100.0%	-$30.1M
CX	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	5,749,324	10,448,824	-45.0%	-$27.9M
VIST	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	782,250	1,841,319	-57.5%	-$25.3M
SE	Sold out	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	0	141,368	-100.0%	-$25.3M
KRSP	New	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	2,799,999	0	-	+$25.0M
B	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	2,975,118	3,302,086	-9.9%	+$21.4M
RWAY	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	7,029,667	8,279,667	-15.1%	-$21.3M
INFY	New	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	1,094,752	0	-	+$19.5M
ONIT	New	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	390,835	0	-	+$17.9M
GRAB	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	11,207,699	12,094,495	-7.3%	-$16.9M
ECVT	Major increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	4,254,503	2,859,022	48.8%	+$16.4M
XP	Major increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	3,320,159	2,032,877	63.3%	+$16.2M
LILA	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	5,748,780	6,669,823	-13.8%	-$13.4M
FCX	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	1,390,053	1,504,865	-7.6%	+$11.6M
YMM	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	3,519,764	3,797,697	-7.3%	-$11.5M
BLCO	Minor increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	3,382,739	3,245,439	4.2%	+$8.9M
TEO	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	2,347,508	2,629,483	-10.7%	+$8.1M
BZ	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	1,523,231	1,643,572	-7.3%	-$7.4M
CORZ	Major increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	8,350,708	6,400,708	30.5%	+$6.8M
TX	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	658,565	897,509	-26.6%	-$6.0M
ITUB	Minor increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	13,822,747	12,665,801	9.1%	+$6.0M
VALE	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	2,023,706	2,033,706	-0.5%	+$4.3M
FTAI	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	517,328	585,175	-11.6%	+$4.2M
NU	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	4,479,175	4,518,884	-0.9%	+$2.6M
ALVO	Minor increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	5,200,323	4,666,667	11.4%	-$2.0M
CBL	Major reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	2,517,576	3,005,126	-16.2%	+$1.3M
LILAB	Minor reduction	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	839,020	846,474	-0.9%	-$816,912
TLN	Minor increase	2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17	331,117	291,117	13.7%	+$280,547

Public video / Interview / Shareholder letter / Public Q&A

Latest 10 + classics

2026-04-09 Investment memo

What’s Going on in Private Credit?

Howard Marks sorts out the evolution of private credit and direct lending. The focus is not to simply judge whether the industry is good or bad, but to remind investors to distinguish between asset structure, underwriting discipline, leverage, liquidity and cycle testing.

He put private credit into the development history of the entire low-rated credit market, from high-yield bonds, leveraged buyouts, securitization to direct loans, indicating that this is part of the long-term innovation of the credit market.
The rapid expansion of private credit is based on the contraction of traditional banks after the banking crisis, institutional investors' pursuit of returns, and private equity's need for financing channels, but the growth rate itself will also create underwriting pressure.
Marks is not concerned about "whether private credit is bad", but whether the assets have been tested through difficult cycles; if many loans are issued quickly in a loose environment, the real risks will not appear until economic stress occurs.
He emphasized that the fortunes of direct lending and private equity were highly correlated, with the quality of cash flows from the underlying portfolio companies determining loan performance, not just the interest rates and collateral on the surface of the loan contract.
This memo is suitable for understanding Oaktree's credit risk framework: yield itself is not enough, one must look at default probability, loss rate, structural protection and cycle position.

2026-02-26 Investment memo

AI Hurtles Ahead

Marks discusses AI again, but the core is not to predict which company will win, but to use bubbles, infrastructure overinvestment, and price discipline to evaluate the investment risks of AI assets.

He acknowledges that AI is no ordinary topical hype, but a technological advance whose speed, capabilities, and autonomy have the potential to transform the structure of the economy.
The real investment question is not whether AI is useful, but whether the market has given the prices of AI-related assets too much certainty in advance.
He used the past railway, Internet and communications infrastructure cycles to remind investors that major technologies can change the world, but they can also destroy the capital of high-priced buyers.
Marks' attitude towards AI is twofold: the technology has huge potential, but there is still a high degree of uncertainty about asset prices, capital expenditures and who will win.
The value of this memo is to separate "technically correct" from "investment correct" and avoid directly equating the long-term space of the theme with the short-term stock returns.

2025-12-09 Investment memo

Is It a Bubble?

Marks responded directly to the AI bubble issue. He did not simply give a binary answer, but split it into four levels: corporate investment behavior, investor psychology, AI infrastructure and market pricing.

He believes that bubbles are first of all a psychological state, not just valuation numbers; when investors ignore prices, risks and uncertainties because of fear of missing out, risks begin to accumulate.
AI may belong to a technology bubble that can promote social progress, but this does not mean that all participants and high-priced assets can make money for investors.
Marks distinguishes between good and bad bubbles: some bubbles accelerate infrastructure construction, but capital losses may still be borne by investors chasing prices higher.
He is particularly concerned about circular transactions, large capital commitments and "lottery-style" expected return calculations, as these may weaken real commercial return constraints.
This memo is very suitable to be placed next to the AI theme on the stock page to remind investors that the long-term correctness of the industry does not mean that the current price is safe.

2025-11-06 Investment memo

Cockroaches in the Coal Mine

Marks discusses risk exposure using the case of early stage problems in credit markets. His concern is whether localized defaults and stress events represent a broader credit cycle turn.

The "cockroaches in the coal mine" in the title corresponds to a risk judgment: if a problem is discovered, it is usually necessary to continue to find whether there are other similar problems hidden in the system.
He put recent credit events into the high-yield debt, private credit and leveraged financing environment, focusing on whether risks were underestimated and mispriced.
Marks does not advocate declaring a crisis upon seeing a few cases, but he also objects to treating each case as an isolated anomaly.
Most useful to investors is the process: examining underwriting standards, leverage, interest coverage, industry cycles, and capital market refinancing windows.
This memo can be used as a credit risk warning material, especially suitable to be read together with discussions on market spreads, default rates, and private placement credit.

2025-10-28 Investment memo

A Look Under the Hood

Marks starts from the perspective of the institutional investment process and discusses easily overlooked issues in investment committees, advisors, risk metrics, and portfolio governance.

This memo is not about individual assets, but the investment decision-making process itself: who makes the recommendations, who takes the risks, and who defines success.
Marks focuses on incentive mismatches between clients and advisors, such as overreliance on volatility, tracking error, or peer comparisons that may steer a portfolio away from its true target.
He emphasized that risk should not be equated only with short-term price fluctuations, and that private equity assets are not mark-to-market does not mean that the real risk is lower.
Long-term capital needs to be designed together with liquidity, return targets, psychological endurance and governance processes, otherwise it is easy to make wrong moves under pressure.
The inspiration of this memo to ordinary investors is: not only ask what to buy, but also ask whether your investment process can withstand mistakes and cycles.

2025-10-12 Investment memo

The Best of...

Marks creates a curated index of his 35 years of memo writing, directly giving the material he believes best represents Oaktree's investment thinking and market cycle observations.

This is not an ordinary new point of view, but a navigation of Howard Marks' public memo system, which can help readers enter Oaktree's ideological system.
He divides the featured memos into two categories: timeless investing principles, and real-time recordings of the most important market events of the past thirty years or so.
Timeless principles include the limitations of second-order thinking, risk control, cycles, price discipline, and macro forecasting.
Market events include the dot-com bubble, the global financial crisis, and changes in the interest rate environment in 2022.
This piece of information connects Howard Marks' representative memos together, making it easy to extend from the latest content to classic content.

2025-08-14 Investment memo

The Calculus of Value

Marks returns to the core of value investing: the relationship between value, price, and expected returns. He uses the valuation of public securities to explain why price discipline is central to all investment judgments.

He breaks down value judgments into growth, durability, return on capital and the price investors are willing to pay, reminding investors that valuation is not a static multiple.
Marks emphasized that the quality of assets cannot be discussed in isolation from price; good companies may also become bad investments because their prices are too high.
This memo is connected to the AI bubble discussion: when the long-term narrative is strong, there is a greater need to explicitly calculate the relationship between price and future returns.
He compared credit and equity in the same framework, explaining that return certainty, risk and price jointly determine the quality of opportunities.
For consumers, this article is the basic material for understanding "why top investors don't chase hot spots."

2025-06-18 Investment memo

More on Repealing the Laws of Economics

Marks continues the discussion of economic laws and policy intervention, using insurance, rents, tariffs, and fiscal deficits to illustrate the side effects of governments trying to suppress price signals.

He believes that economic laws are not political slogans, and that if prices, supply and demand, and incentives are forcibly distorted, they will usually generate greater costs elsewhere.
The California fire insurance example illustrates that if prices do not reflect the true risk, supply will withdraw and consumers end up with unavailable insurance rather than cheap insurance.
He extended this logic to tariffs, rent controls, and fiscal deficits, emphasizing that there was often a gap between policy goals and economic outcomes.
For investors, policy is not a negligible variable; it changes capital allocation, industry profits, and risk pricing.
This memo places the topics of macro policy, insurance, fiscal deficits, and interest rates within the same risk framework.

2025-03-06 Investment memo

Gimme Credit

Marks answers the market's most frequently asked credit spread question: The key is not whether the spread is narrow, but whether current earnings are sufficient to cover future credit losses.

He included the long-term default rate and loss rate of high-yield bonds into the calculation, reminding investors not to just look at the absolute yield or spread level.
After interest rates return to higher levels from near zero, credit assets regain discussable absolute returns, but this does not mean there is no risk.
Marks argued that credit versus equity offered a more attractive risk reward at the time because cash flows were more contractual and less uncertain.
He remains a reminder of the need for underwriting discipline in both private credit and high-yield debt, especially assets that have not yet gone through a full distress cycle.
This memo is important material in understanding why Oaktree prefers credit opportunities.

2025-01-07 Investment memo

On Bubble Watch

Marks looks back at the Bubble Identification Framework on the 25th anniversary of bubble.com, discussing the dangers of extreme psychology, hot faucet persistence, and "this time it's different."

He reminded investors that bubbles are not just high valuations, but a combination of extreme psychology and widespread belief that there is no upper limit to the future.
Even if a popular company is really good, it may not be able to maintain its market leadership position for a long time. Investors often overestimate the sustainability of winners.
Marks does not make bubble judgments into an accurate clock, but uses environmental observations to decide whether more caution should be used.
This memo is of great reference to the market in the context of AI and Magnificent Seven, because it reuses the psychological framework of the Internet bubble period.
This classic memo illustrates that risk not only comes from bad assets, but can also come from bad prices of good assets.

2022-12-13 Investment memo Classic

Sea Change

Marks believes that changes in interest rates and inflation in 2022 may constitute the third major environment switch of his career, ending the tailwind that long periods of low interest rates have had on asset prices in the past.

He calls the rise in interest rates after 2022 a potential sea change because it changes the return benchmark for stocks, bonds, private equity and credit.
The tailwind of falling interest rates over the past four decades, which has pushed up valuations, depressed financing costs, and encouraged leverage, may now turn into a headwind.
In the new environment, credit assets may once again offer attractive contractual returns, and value and risk control will become more important again.
Marks did not predict the short-term market, but instead reminded investors to recalibrate "normal returns" and asset allocation.
This is one of Oaktree’s most classic memos in recent years and is suitable as a core entry for interest rate cycles and asset allocation materials.

2003-07-01 Investment memo Classic

The Most Important Thing

This memo was one of the sources of thoughts for Marks' later book of the same name. The core is that there is no single most important thing, and good investment requires multiple principles to be established at the same time.

Marks used the expression "the most important thing" to repeatedly illustrate that investment success is not a formula, but a set of mutually restrictive principles.
Key principles include second-order thinking, price discipline, risk control, cycle awareness, contrarian behavior, and patience.
This material emphasizes that good investors should see risks or opportunities where others ignore them, rather than just obtaining the same information.
It also explains why Oaktree places a premium on avoiding big mistakes: Compounding interest first requires staying in the game for the long term.
The core is that this is the most suitable classic for getting started with Howard Marks' public ideology.

2001-11-20 Investment memo Classic

You Can't Predict. You Can Prepare.

Marks' classic risk control memo: Investors cannot reliably predict events, but they can improve their survival probability through portfolio structure, risk budget and psychological preparation.

The core idea is to change investment from a prediction game to a preparation game, admitting that the future is unknowable, but it does not mean that nothing can be done.
Preparation includes diversifying risks, avoiding excessive leverage, maintaining liquidity, reducing the probability of permanent loss, and setting response principles in advance.
This memo is particularly useful to ordinary investors because it pulls risk management away from complex models and back to behavior and structure.
Marks's view of risk is not to always be defensive, but to give the portfolio the ability to withstand bad results and seize subsequent opportunities in an uncertain environment.
It is one of the classic entries into Oaktree's investment philosophy and should be displayed together with "Sea Change" and "The Most Important Thing".