13FGuru
Sign in with Google Sign in with Discord
Berkshire Hathaway avatar

Warren Buffett

Berkshire Hathaway

Berkshire Hathaway chair, insurance float and high-quality compounding

Berkshire Hathaway is one of the clearest public records for value investing, insurance float, and permanent capital allocation. The useful evidence is not just the 13F: annual letters, annual meetings, repurchases, cash decisions, wholly owned operating businesses, insurance liabilities, and the public stock portfolio all shape long-term value per share.

Sources Berkshire Hathaway official site SEC EDGAR profile Berkshire 2024 annual report Berkshire annual letters Berkshire annual reports
Quality value / insurance float CIK 1067983
2026-03-31 Latest 13F 20 Current holdings 58 Last 4 periods Change 14 Public materials
Latest 13F snapshot 2026-03-31 · 29 disclosed positions · $263.1B Top five 67.1%: AAPL, AXP, KO, BAC, CVX

Performance materials

  • Berkshire's 2024 annual report lists 1965-2024 compound annual growth in market value per share of about 19.9%, versus about 10.4% for the S&P 500 with dividends.
  • That is Berkshire shareholder-level compounding, not a return series for the 13F stock portfolio alone.
  • The annual report table is the main public performance record.

Firm and key people

  • Buffett started Buffett Partnership in 1956 and took control of Berkshire Hathaway around 1965, turning a textile company into an insurance-led holding company.
  • He and Charlie Munger built an investment culture around durable competitive advantages, capital allocation, management quality, and after-tax compounding.
  • Berkshire has unusually rich public materials: annual reports, shareholder letters, annual meetings, and 13F filings can be read as one long record.

Investment style

  • Buy businesses with lasting pricing power and high returns on capital when the price leaves a margin of safety.
  • Use insurance float and permanent capital carefully; prefer low leverage, strong cash generation, and trustworthy management.
  • Read the public stocks together with wholly owned subsidiaries, cash, and insurance liabilities.

Public materials

View timeline
Shareholder letters / memos 4
Interview 2
Public video 4
Public Q&A / speeches / presentations 4

Current holdings

13F period 2026-03-31 · Filed 2026-05-15
Stocks Shares Value Weight
AAPL 227,917,808 $57.8B 22.0%
AXP 151,610,700 $45.9B 17.4%
KO 400,000,000 $30.4B 11.6%
BAC 513,624,165 $25.0B 9.5%
CVX 84,375,856 $17.5B 6.6%
OXY 264,941,431 $17.2B 6.5%
GOOGL 54,249,798 $15.6B 5.9%
CB 34,249,183 $11.2B 4.2%
MCO 24,669,778 $10.8B 4.1%
KHC 325,634,818 $7.3B 2.8%
DVA 30,100,585 $4.6B 1.8%
KR 50,000,000 $3.6B 1.4%
SIRI 124,807,117 $2.9B 1.1%
DAL 39,809,456 $2.6B 1.0%
VRSN 8,989,880 $2.2B 0.8%
COF 7,150,000 $1.3B 0.5%
NYT 15,146,535 $1.3B 0.5%
ALLY 29,000,000 $1.1B 0.4%
GOOG 3,585,215 $1.0B 0.4%
LLYVK 10,587,143 $996.4M 0.4%

Last 4 quarters US 13F new / increased / reduced / sold-out positions

As of 13F 2026-03-31 · Filed 2026-05-15
Last 1 quarters Last 2 quarters Last 3 quarters Last 4 quarters
Stocks Action 13F period Current shares Previous shares Share change 13F value change
GOOGL Major increase 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 54,249,798 17,846,142 204.0% +$10.0B
BAC Minor reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 513,624,165 517,295,934 -0.7% -$3.4B
V Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 8,297,460 -100.0% -$2.9B
DAL New 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 39,809,456 0 - +$2.6B
CVX Major reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 84,375,856 130,156,362 -35.2% -$2.4B
MA Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 3,986,648 -100.0% -$2.3B
STZ Major reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 632,890 13,000,000 -95.1% -$1.7B
UNH Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 5,039,564 -100.0% -$1.7B
DPZ Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 3,350,000 -100.0% -$1.4B
AON Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 3,602,995 -100.0% -$1.3B
GOOG New 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 3,585,215 0 - +$1.0B
DVA Minor reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 30,100,585 31,759,065 -5.2% +$1.0B
NYT Major increase 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 15,146,535 5,065,744 199.0% +$916.6M
POOL Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 3,068,885 -100.0% -$702.0M
AMZN Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 2,276,000 -100.0% -$525.3M
NUE Major reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 3,907,075 6,407,749 -39.0% -$384.5M
HEI.A Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 1,294,612 -100.0% -$326.8M
FWONK Sold out 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 0 3,018,555 -100.0% -$297.4M
LEN Major increase 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 10,099,642 7,050,950 43.2% +$152.2M
LLYVK Minor reduction 2026-03-31 Filed 2026-05-15 10,587,143 10,917,661 -3.0% +$88.4M
CB Minor increase 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 34,249,183 31,332,895 9.3% +$1.8B
AMZN Major reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 2,276,000 10,000,000 -77.2% -$1.7B
AAPL Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 227,917,808 238,212,764 -4.3% +$1.3B
LLYVK* Sold out 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 0 10,917,661 -100.0% -$1.1B
LLYVK New 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 10,917,661 0 - +$907.9M
CVX Minor increase 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 130,156,362 122,064,792 6.6% +$881.7M
BAC Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 517,295,934 568,070,012 -8.9% -$855.5M
DVA Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 31,759,065 32,160,579 -1.2% -$665.0M
LLYVA New 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 4,986,588 0 - +$406.4M
POOL Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 3,068,885 3,458,885 -11.3% -$370.5M
NYT New 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 5,065,744 0 - +$351.7M
FWONK New 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 3,018,555 0 - +$297.4M
AON Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 3,602,995 4,100,000 -12.1% -$190.6M
DPZ Minor increase 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 3,350,000 2,981,945 12.3% +$109.0M
STZ Minor reduction 2025-12-31 Filed 2026-02-17 13,000,000 13,400,000 -3.0% -$11.1M
GOOGL New 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 17,846,142 0 - +$4.3B
AAPL Minor reduction 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 238,212,764 280,000,000 -14.9% +$3.2B
VRSN Major reduction 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 8,989,880 13,289,880 -32.4% -$1.3B
CB Major increase 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 31,332,895 27,033,784 15.9% +$1.0B
BAC Minor reduction 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 568,070,012 605,267,375 -6.1% +$665.5M
DVA Minor reduction 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 32,160,579 33,796,541 -4.8% -$541.1M
SIRI Minor increase 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 124,807,117 119,776,692 4.2% +$153.6M
LEN Minor increase 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 7,050,950 7,048,993 0.0% +$109.0M
DPZ Minor increase 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 2,981,945 2,633,868 13.2% +$100.5M
NUE Minor reduction 2025-09-30 Filed 2025-11-14 6,407,749 6,614,112 -3.1% +$11.0M
AAPL Minor reduction 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 280,000,000 300,000,000 -6.7% -$9.2B
CVX Minor increase 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 122,064,792 118,610,534 2.9% -$2.4B
BAC Minor reduction 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 605,267,375 631,573,531 -4.2% +$2.3B
UNH New 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 5,039,564 0 - +$1.6B
TMUS Sold out 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 0 3,883,145 -100.0% -$1.0B
NUE New 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 6,614,112 0 - +$856.8M
LEN New 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 7,048,993 0 - +$779.7M
DVA Minor reduction 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 33,796,541 35,142,479 -3.8% -$561.4M
POOL Major increase 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 3,458,885 1,464,000 136.3% +$542.1M
CHTR Major reduction 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 1,060,882 1,984,259 -46.5% -$297.6M
HEI.A Minor increase 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 1,294,612 1,162,088 11.4% +$89.8M
STZ Minor increase 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 13,400,000 12,009,000 11.6% -$24.0M
DPZ Minor increase 2025-06-30 Filed 2025-08-14 2,633,868 2,620,613 0.5% -$17.2M

Public video / Interview / Shareholder letter / Public Q&A

Latest 10 + classics
Interview

Warren Buffett's Mid-Meeting Live Interview

Buffett was interviewed by Becky Quick during halftime of the 2026 Berkshire Annual Meeting, focusing on his post-CEO role, Greg Abel's mandate, scarcity of market opportunities, AI, and Berkshire's cash option.

  • Buffett stated that he would still come to the office and still participate in investment discussions, but Greg Abel was already CEO; if Greg did not agree with an investment, he would not push it.
  • He believed that it was not an ideal environment for Berkshire to deploy capital on a large scale. The market had a strong short-term trading and gambling mentality, and there were not many prices that really made Berkshire willing to take a heavy position.
  • The explanation for the huge amount of cash is not pessimism, but options: Berkshire must be able to act quickly when others are nervous or short of money, and cannot buy mediocre assets just to appear active.
  • Be cautious when talking about AI: AI may change many industries and amplify fraud and reputational risks, but capital allocation still comes back to understanding business, price, and long-term competitive advantage.
  • This interview clearly shows the first-hand changes in the post-Buffett era: Buffett is still there, but the center of decision-making has turned to Abel.
Shareholder meeting

2026 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Greg Abel hosted the annual meeting for the first time as Berkshire CEO, with Buffett present as chairman. The focus shifted from Buffett's personal Q&A to Berkshire's operating system, cultural continuity and Q&A with each business leader.

  • The core signal of the meeting was the succession: Berkshire no longer relied on Buffett to sit on the stage to answer all questions, but instead showcased operating leaders such as Abel, Ajit Jain, BNSF and NetJets.
  • Abel emphasized maintaining a decentralized culture and not turning Berkshire into a headquarters-based company with layers of approvals; this corresponds to the trust, authorization and low headquarters costs that Buffett has emphasized for many years.
  • The Q&A focuses more on operational details, including railways, insurance, aviation services, capital expenditures and subsidiary management methods, which can more directly determine whether Abel understands Berkshire’s true assets.
  • The meeting also put AI and deepfakes risks into a governance context: Berkshire does not chase hot topics, but must understand how the technology affects customers, fraud, cybersecurity and reputation.
  • For investors, this piece of information is not about looking for the stock code, but about whether Berkshire’s system can continue to operate after Buffett steps back.
Interview

CNBC Squawk Box Interview with Warren Buffett

One of Buffett's first long interviews since stepping down as CEO, on the return of charity lunches, office routines, Greg Abel, Apple, cash, T-Bills, market declines, and circle of competence issues at AI/tech companies.

  • He explained that he still goes into the office every day, but his speed and coverage are no longer as good as Greg Abel; Greg can follow up on more subsidiaries and operational issues at the same time, which is an important reason for handing over the baton.
  • He confirmed that he will still look at the investment and trading tables, but will not do anything that Greg does not agree with; this gives the boundaries of investment authority in the post-Buffett era.
  • When talking about Apple, he said that he sold it too early, but Apple is still Berkshire’s largest public stock investment; he regards Apple as a consumer company, and the core is user stickiness and product practicality.
  • Faced with the market correction in the first quarter, he believes that this is not a big drop enough to excite Berkshire; the real opportunity is for them to own a good business at a good price for many years.
  • He also talked about T-Bills and cash management, explaining that Berkshire's idle funds are also operated with extremely low manpower and extremely high discipline, and are not simply lying around.
  • The attitude towards AI in the interview is very typical: admit that the technology is useful, but do not enter the judgment zone that you are not good at just because it is popular.
Shareholder letter / fund letter

Berkshire Hathaway 2025 Annual Report

Greg Abel's first CEO shareholder letter. It is not a long letter written by Buffett, but it is very important because it is the first time to use the language of a formal annual report to explain Berkshire’s capital allocation and cultural continuation after Buffett’s retirement.

  • Abel did not imitate Buffett's writing style, but used a more direct business tone to talk about Berkshire's culture, long-term framework, reputation constraints and capital discipline.
  • The letter cited as the basis for continuation the framework established by Buffett and Munger: financial strength, diversification, good managers, conservative debt, and long-term ownership.
  • The huge pile of cash is interpreted as a strategic asset, not an abandonment of investments; it allows Berkshire to move quickly when markets panic, sellers are desperate for capital, or a big deal emerges.
  • Insurance remains central to understanding Berkshire, with float, underwriting discipline and reinsurance risk determining long-term capital costs and shock resistance.
  • This letter should be read together with the 2026 Annual Meeting: Letter to the Framework, the Annual Meeting will see whether Abel can translate the Framework into on-site judgment and operational answers.
Shareholder letter / fund letter

Warren Buffett Thanksgiving Letter

In his Thanksgiving message, Buffett confirmed that he would no longer write long letters to Berkshire’s annual report and would no longer speak for long periods of time at the annual meeting; he also told Greg Abel to take over, that he would continue to serve as chairman, and that he would accelerate charitable donations.

  • The letter was a watershed moment in Buffett's public communications: Rather than leaving Berkshire, he was stepping back from the role of CEO/annual writer to chairman and long-term shareholder.
  • He clearly supports Greg Abel taking over as CEO at the end of the year and emphasizes that he will not sell Berkshire shares to convey his trust in the successor.
  • The letter talks a lot about luck, family, aging, and financial responsibility, and the tone is more like a personal testamentary communication than a traditional investment letter.
  • The acceleration of charitable arrangements indicates that Buffett’s personal asset allocation has also entered the inheritance stage; this will affect the pace of Berkshire’s stock donations in the future, but it is not a selling view at the operating level.
  • The letter was among Buffett's formal public communications to shareholders and explained the boundaries of his subsequent public appearances.
Shareholder meeting

2025 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Buffett's final Berkshire annual meeting as CEO. The biggest story was his announcement at the end of the meeting that he would recommend to the board that Greg Abel take over as CEO at the end of the year.

  • The succession announcement at the end of the meeting changed the meaning of the entire material: previous questions about cash, tariffs, fiscal deficits, dollars, and subsidiary management became clues to the background of Abel's takeover.
  • Buffett admitted that he is not as active in the management of subsidiaries as Abel, suggesting that Berkshire may be more proactive in operating supervision in the future, but this does not mean changing the long-term capital allocation principles.
  • He expressed caution on trade and tariffs, emphasizing that trade should not be used as a weapon; this has macro implications for Berkshire's manufacturing, railroad, energy and consumer businesses.
  • Huge amounts of cash continue to be explained under the discipline of capital allocation: not to predict the market, but because there are not enough opportunities that meet price and quality requirements.
  • This video should serve as a key node in the official handover of the Buffett era, connecting it with the 2025 Thanksgiving letter and the 2026 conference.
Shareholder letter / fund letter

Berkshire Hathaway 2024 Annual Report / Warren Buffett Letter

Buffett's 60th annual shareholder letter, reviewing Berkshire's transformation from a textile mill to a large conglomerate, explaining cash, taxes, investment opportunities, insurance, and Japanese trading company positions.

  • The letter restates the core of Berkshire in a 60-year perspective: good business, long-term holding, conservative finances, good managers, and avoiding devastating risks.
  • Buffett emphasized that Berkshire still prefers owning good businesses rather than permanently holding cash; cash becomes large because of insufficient prices and opportunities, rather than giving up stocks or business investments.
  • He mentioned that Berkshire contributes a large amount of taxes to the U.S. treasury and reminded the government to cherish and use these funds wisely; this continued his concern for the stability of the system and the dollar.
  • Japan's Big Five trading houses continue to serve as examples of long-term non-U.S. equity investments, illustrating Berkshire's willingness to allocate overseas companies when the understanding, price, and governance are right.
  • This letter is appropriate for the average investor because it condenses Buffett's investment framework into the language of operations, taxes, cash, and long-term compounding.
Shareholder meeting

2024 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

First Berkshire Annual Meeting after the death of Charlie Munger. Buffett joins Greg Abel and Ajit Jain to talk Apple reductions, capital gains taxes, AI scams, Paramount losses and the Berkshire succession.

  • Buffett explained that part of the reduction in Apple is related to the possible increase in capital gains tax rates in the future, while still viewing Apple as a very important and high-quality business for Berkshire.
  • His admission that he took responsibility for Paramount's investment losses is valuable: top investors make mistakes, and the key is admitting, exiting, and controlling losses.
  • The AI ​​discussion does not pursue the concept of computing power, but emphasizes that deep forgery and financial fraud will reduce the cost of trust and may become a very large social risk.
  • Without Munger, the meeting itself was a succession stress test: Abel and Jain's answers showed shareholders that Berkshire's operating knowledge did not reside solely with Buffett.
  • This profile is good for relating Apple, media investing lessons, AI risks, and Berkshire governance.
Shareholder letter / fund letter

Berkshire Hathaway 2023 Annual Report / Warren Buffett Letter

First Buffett shareholder letter after Munger's death. It opens with Munger as the architect of Berkshire and Buffett himself more as a general contractor; then returns to long-term holdings, insurance, energy, cash and avoiding Wall Street noise.

  • The heart of the letter is not the tribute itself, but the explanation of how Munger moved Buffett from a cheap bad business to a great business at a fair price.
  • Buffett continues to caution shareholders to ignore accounting noise from short-term GAAP net income fluctuations, particularly changes in public stock market capitalization.
  • He emphasized that Berkshire's size is already very large, and the future excess return space cannot be as exaggerated as in the early days; this is important for investors to understand BRK.B's expectations.
  • Insurance, BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and public stock portfolios are looked at in different risk cycles and cannot be judged by just one quarter's profit.
  • The letter's caution against Wall Street forecasts, frequent trading, and short-term advisory advice continued the educational function of Buffett's letters to long-term shareholders.
Shareholder meeting

2023 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Buffett shared the stage with Munger to answer questions about the banking crisis, Apple, Occidental, TSMC, AI, Sino-US relations, and the resilience of the US economy. It was one of Munger's last major public Q&A sessions.

  • Buffett made it clear that he has no plans to acquire all of Occidental's shares, indicating that holding a significant position and a wholly-owned acquisition are two completely different capital allocation actions.
  • He calls Apple a better business than most companies wholly owned by Berkshire, emphasizing consumer stickiness and capital efficiency rather than viewing it purely as a technology stock.
  • During the discussion on the banking crisis, he emphasized the importance of deposit confidence and regulatory communication; one of the biggest risks to the financial system is not accounting numbers, but the spread of panic.
  • The TSMC problem illustrates Buffett's geo-risk framework: the company itself can be very good, but location and foreseeable risks affect willingness to hold positions.
  • Munger remained highly critical of U.S.-China tensions and the AI ​​craze, and this meeting is also important material for understanding Buffett-Munger's shared perspective in the final stages.
Public Q&A Classic

Warren Buffett and Bill Gates: Keeping America Great

Buffett's open Q&A with Bill Gates for students at Columbia Business School. The setting is the aftermath of the financial crisis, and topics focus on American capitalism, career choices, innovation, philanthropy, and how to maintain long-term judgment in a recession.

  • After the financial crisis, Buffett still emphasized the long-term resilience of American institutions and corporate creativity, and did not equate short-term financial system mistakes with long-term economic failure.
  • Career advice continues his main line at the University of Florida: choose a job that you really love, and surround yourself with excellent, credible people who can continue to learn.
  • Sharing the stage with Gates makes this Q&A more suitable for ordinary investors: one represents capital allocation, the other represents technological innovation, and both put long-term curiosity and reading habits at the core.
  • The discussion links wealth and social responsibility, indicating that making money is not the end, and that capital, charity and institutional responsibility need to be looked at together.
  • This material would fit nicely into a classic public Q&A: it is not a single stock view, but an explanation of how Buffett sees the U.S., careers, and the long-term compounding environment.
Public speech Classic

Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market

Fortune's classic market valuation article based on Buffett's 1999 Sun Valley speech. It explains that long-term stock returns ultimately come from interest rates, corporate profits and investor expectations, rather than the market story itself.

  • Buffett rarely predicts markets publicly, with the exception of 1999, as investor expectations during the dot-com bubble had become significantly divorced from corporate profit and interest rate constraints.
  • The article uses long-term history to dismantle the sources of stock returns: changes in interest rates can push up valuations, there is an upper limit to the ratio of corporate profits to GDP, and valuation expansion cannot be repeated indefinitely.
  • It later became one of the ideological sources of the Buffett Indicator: when the total market capitalization is too high relative to the size of the economy, future return expectations need to be adjusted downwards.
  • This is not to teach people to escape from the top, but to remind people not to linearly extrapolate the high returns of the past ten years to the future.
  • The classic significance is that it puts macro valuation in a very simple way: the market ultimately cannot be permanently divorced from the true profitability of the company.
Public speech Classic

Warren Buffett Lecture at University of Florida

Buffett's classic public lecture and Q&A for University of Florida MBA students, spanning integrity, circles of competence, good business, long-term holding, LTCM, risk, and career choices.

  • The question about the future income of 10% of the students at the beginning connects investment and life: the people worth betting on in the long term are usually not the smartest people, but people who are credible, stable, generous, and able to cooperate with others.
  • He emphasized that among integrity, intelligence and energy, integrity is the most important; without integrity, intelligence and diligence will become a dangerous combination.
  • We repeatedly talk about the circle of competence in investment: excellent companies do not mean they can be bought. The key is whether you can judge the competitive landscape and economic characteristics ten years from now.
  • He used examples such as Coca-Cola, GEICO, Disney, and Microsoft to talk about moats and consumption habits, demonstrating that a truly good business can make time a friend.
  • When talking about LTCM, they emphasize not taking devastating risks for money you don't need; high IQ and high leverage cannot offset false incentives and overconfidence.
  • This video is easy to understand because it is not about financial report details, but about telling investment principles, professional principles and risk principles into a story that ordinary people can understand.
Public speech Classic

The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville

Buffett gave a lecture at Columbia for the 50th anniversary of Security Analysis, later compiled into an article. It is one of the most classic public defenses of value investing, using the long track record of a group of Graham-Dodd investors to refute the claim that markets are perfectly efficient.

  • The core argument is not that one person is lucky, but that many people from the same investment village use different combinations, different markets and different years to beat the market in the long term.
  • Buffett illustrates with the analogy of a coin toss: if the winners all come from the same methodological source, they cannot simply be attributed to randomness.
  • The speech put the margin of safety, intrinsic value and independent judgment at the center, explaining that value investing is not about looking down on PE, but using the difference between price and value to manage errors.
  • This material is suitable to be placed in the classics area because it is a representative text that upgrades Buffett's investment philosophy from personal experience to methodological evidence.
  • After reading this, you can understand why Buffett does not believe in frequent trading and predicting the market, but values ​​a small number of understandable, valuable, and appropriately priced opportunities.